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Augustine's Punishments During Augustine's life, government authorities in Africa were generally friendly to the Christianity he came to adopt and defend. His correspondence mentions one imperial magistrate in Africa, Virius Nicomachus Flavianus, a pagan vicar of Africa who seemed partial to Donatist Christians whom Augustine considered secessionists. Otherwise, from the 390s to 430, assorted proconsuls, vicars, and tribunes sent from the imperial chancery and asked to maintain order in North Africa were willing to enforce government edicts against Donatists and pagans.
1 And, to an extent, Augustine endorsed enforcement. He was troubled by punitive measures that looked excessive to him, yet scholars generally agree with Peter Burnell that Augustine unambiguously approved punitive judgments as an "unavoidable" necessity. But Burnell and others seem to make too much of it: Augustine's position on punishment supposedly indicates that he posited "an essential continuity" (rather than emphasized the contrast) between "any given state" and the celestial or "eschatological" city of God.
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What follows will review some of Augustine's most often cited remarks on punishment and a number that are less well known. 3 We shall find that his approval was not only grudgingly given and guarded at times but relatively restrictive and occasionally accompanied by doubts about the effectiveness of punishment in terrestrial cities. And, even when he acknowledged severe measures usefully preserved terrestrial peace, he underscored distinctions between that peace and the peace of the celestial city. Augustine depicted fear and force in this world in ways that ought to give pause to historians prepared to emphasize "essential continuit [ies] " between a punishing government and a Christianity ready to propose "complementary roles" for each. And this assessment of Augustine's punishments ought to give pause to political theorists ever ready, it seems, to reconstruct his "morally robust civic liberalism." 4 
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instruction and kind words could draw Donatist secessionists back into the church, he was prepared to let their previous indiscretion go unpunished. He doubted the appropriateness of formulating new--and enforcing old--punitive measures advocated by his colleagues. But, as his invitations to reconciliation were refused, he defended the use of intimidation and coercion, and he referred to New Testament passages that seemed to sanction bruising behavior. He deployed the parable in which Jesus ordered that "guests" be compelled to attend a wedding banquet. He remembered that the apostle Paul announced he was ready to punish disobedience and that Paul himself had been "brought to the gospel" by some rough handling. 10 To Augustine, the secessionists' sense of superiority--which, in their judgment, was legitimate and which licensed them to confiscate the churches from which they seceded--was conspicuously contrary to the humility prescribed by their sacred texts. Donatists argued that baptisms in their rivals' churches were invalid because bishops presiding over that sacrament declined to countenance the century-old coup against colleagues who allegedly collaborated with pagan persecutors of the church. Baptisms in the early fifth century, in other words, were bogus as long as presiding bishops would not repudiate predecessors in the early fourth century whom the first Donatists accused of having caved under government pressure. Augustine denied that a bishop's allegiance to long-gone partisans or his character affected sacraments he administered.
(Indeed, the secessionists ought to recall, Augustine said, that Jesus had accepted baptism from someone inferior to himself. 11 ) In Augustine's judgment, the Donatists' arrogance ensured that they would be subjected to those dreadful, eternal punishments that were reserved for those who misplaced their faith in what was "perishable," in specious virtues as well as possessions. Hence, when he eventually accepted that it was advantageous (non inutile) to ask the government to assist the church in disciplining, intimidating, correcting, and coercing secessionists, Augustine 4 explained that punitive measures were in the Donatists' interest. They were "paternal" (paterna flagella), sparing secessionists eternal torment in the hereafter as well as stopping them from sowing discord in the here and now.
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Ivonne Tholen notes that Augustine rarely introduced the devil into his anti-Donatist polemic. 13 Nonetheless, the Donatists' libels against the Christianity that he and his closest colleagues defended tempted Augustine to brand his rivals as diabolical. He was ready to bury the past (pro me sunt gesta omnia), he insisted, but a demon "implanted" in the Donatists' souls kept them dredging up and disseminating their ascertainably inaccurate account of the origins of the schism. The secessionists' persistence attested a satanic presence and turned their schism into sin and heresy. In effect, they forfeited their Christianity, and the devil's counsels kept Donatist clergy and laity beyond non-coercive recall.
14 They were a sect, and, Augustine repeatedly pointed out, the sectarians were uncharitable toward each other--spawning sub-sects--as well as uncharitable toward Christians who believed the secession of their forebears and the enduring disunity unwarranted. And, to Augustine, their fissiparous character exhibited in the intense rivalry among Donatists made their claim to be the authentic Christian church ludicrous. Besides, all Donatists sects had severed their connections not only with many North African churches but also with all, save a very few, Christians across the Mediterranean, as if to say that "Christ only bought Africa"--and a portion of Africa, at that--with his atonement for the sins of all the faithful. Did Jesus die to redeem a region or to save the secessionist squadrons therein, which--unforgiving--vilified the faithful who lived among them and preferred to remain in communion with churches in Rome or Arles, that is, with a universal or catholic church? Noli quiescere; one must not let such absurdity pass undisputed, Augustine said, stipulating that reprimands be accompanied by blows (verberibus). 15 He acknowledged that the fairness of battering the sectarians might not have been immediately obvious, but he asserted that God had placed secular powers in sympathy with the church for good reason, knowing his faithful would eventually be in danger of being overtaken by rivals. So it was fitting--and not unfair--for the faithful to urge the government to use punitive measures. Indeed, there could be no unfairness (iniquitas) in God; punishments and the suffering they occasioned were "remedial" as well as "paternal." Augustine and his colleagues were not seeking vengeance. They were looking for--and they found, he said--the gratitude of those 20 No doubt, he was satisfied--by then he thought Manichaeism put souls' salvation in jeopardy--but he was relatively indifferent to proliferating punishments. 21 Generally, he believed punishment deterred, disciplined, and suppressed--but it did not contribute to the establishment of genuine justice (vera justitia), which was unattainable in this wicked world. 22 He may have suspected as much by the late 390s, when he confided what had become of his political ambitions ten years before. 23 Robert Dodaro, however, could be correct:
Augustine's spiraling despair of ever achieving genuine justice with retributive, restorative, punitive measures may be related to his increasing concern to counter Pelagians' optimism.
Nonetheless, his comments on magistrates' inability to do more than damage control, which were composed as he became acquainted with Pelagianism, look to have been based on his previously expressed pessimism. 24 His most explicit reference to damage control surfaces in a letter to Macedonius, the Vicar of Africa in 413 and 414. There, Augustine wrote about the parts punishment played in keeping wickedness in check (coercentur mali) and in restraining the impudence of persons who, 7 without the likelihood that they would pay for their outrages, would take every chance to prey on their virtuous and peacable neighbors (coercetur audacia). Augustine was trying to convince
Macedonius that bishops, who petitioned authorities to spare those offenders who looked to be promising candidates for rehabilitation, were not opposed to punitive policies. All agreed that punishments inspired fear among the wicked, which enabled good citizens to live without fear.
Good citizens were beneficiaries of the damage control that was necessary in a world where so many of Adam's offspring behaved criminally; the church and its faithful were beneficiaries. 25 Bishops would have been ill-advised unequivocally to oppose punishments, but a prelate's job was to spot opportunities to redeem miscreants, to preach repentance, and to work for personal rehabilitations. Augustine suggested to Macedonius that the church and civil magistrates could
cooperate to realize what we might term "relative justice," a return of stolen property, assuring the vicar that prelates were his allies on the issue of restitution. But that assurance was not the first step toward collaborations that might lead to a rehabilitation or evangelization of society.
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Cruelty and villainy were too pervasive. For Augustine, the point of punishment was to bridle corrupt desire. Punitive measures could never obliterate it; Augustine's letter to Macedonius implies that corruption was current in the courts. Litigants bought special consideration. The court clerks received tips, which resembled bribes and which could be justified, Augustine allowed, if proceeds were shared with the poor. But money paid to judges, before or after verdicts were formulated, and to witnesses was unconscionable. 27 Why not leave punishment to God who was above bribery? Although God may have seemed asleep to onlookers who saw that, in time, the unrighteous and shameless often went unpunished, the faithful believed that, in God's time, the inordinately acquisitive and arrogant 8 would be punished everlastingly. In the interim, all citizens must learn to live with the secular courts' imperfections. 28 Augustine did have a court of his own. Constantine decreed that bishops preside as judges in assemblies or "audiences" to resolve disputes and, in effect, to punish losers whose cases were unconvincing. But Augustine groused that parishioners' complaints (or "causes")
were frequently unrelated to their faith and concerned secular business. 29 True, the apostle Paul directed the faithful in Corinth not to take their squabbles to secular magistrates, yet the itinerant apostle never stayed in one place long enough to cope with the consequences. Augustine made a point of putting Paul above the fray, never having to umpire or resolve disputes among querulous
Christians. Centuries later, Christianity's bishops not as lucky. They were uncomfortably aware of what followed from Paul's prohibition--vexatious litigation. 30 Arguably, the most serious problem facing bishops presiding in their "audiences" was that their work as pastors was compromised by their work as magistrates, by punitive verdicts they delivered. For when two parties clashed in court, each supposing that justice resided on its side, at least one would leave aggrieved and with a grudge against the judge. He was corrupt or, at best, imperceptive, litigious losers would say, impairing his ability to console and counsel. 31 Within courts, the faithful whined, ranted, and raged, even when they were attempting to right palpable wrongs and punish wrongdoers.
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Determining disciplinary measures was a delicate matter when bishops were caught misbehaving. After pronouncing judgment on Antoninus, whom he had appointed bishop of Fussala, a diocese he carved from his own, Augustine was likely relieved to hear that he had been scratched from the list of judges hearing his nominee's appeals. Augustine presumed that,
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"until the end of time," churches would be led by officials seeking promotion for personal gain, yet he thought that Antoninus was cut from different cloth. He was wrong. Antoninus extorted funds and feathered his nest with what belonged to parishioners. Augustine found no compelling evidence of sexual misconduct, of which the thieving bishop of Fussala had been accused, so he dismissed those charges, yet he ordered Antoninus to give back property he had commandeered to build his new home. In effect, Augustine also deposed his appointee, instructing the residents to select a new bishop. But Antoninus was permitted to retain quasi-episcopal jurisdiction over several estates, and that seemed to satisfy him until the consecration of his successor at Fussala was scheduled. Then, he appealed. 33 Augustine was angry; Antoninus, he said, shamelessly packed his account of the episode that accompanied his appeal with lies. 34 Yet they prompted two successive bishops of Rome to order reviews of the original accusations and deliberations--reviews from which, as we learned, Augustine was excluded. We know nothing about the outcome. And we cannot tell what led to Antoninus's appointment and why Augustine let him salvage some authority. Possibly he was popular among his (and Augustine's) clerical colleagues. We can only infer from the tone and substance of Augustine's extended review of the affair that he regretted his appointment and especially his appointee's expropriations and antics. As for the relatively light punishment he initially imposed, Augustine appears to have feared that resorting to something more severe at the onset would have resulted in a round of recriminations, embarrassed the church, and given pagans and Donatists a scandal to spin to the disadvantage of catholic Christianity. she gives Augustine along with late antiquity's other Christian "realists" credit for having coped with the "harsh realities" of crime and punishment and for the little moderation she perceives. 36 But Christianity's civilizing influence, had it been widespread and conspicuous, would attract swarms of historians, one would imagine, and it has not. Still, there is no denying that Augustine had a few magistrates rethinking the severity of their sentences. He intervened to save Christian rioters at Calama, thirty miles from Hippo, but in another's diocese, from corporal punishment. 37 That said, however, as we have discovered, scholars who insist he posited a "complementarity"
or an "essential continuity" between the secular and the celestial often emphasize a punishing rather than a pardoning Augustine, an Augustine whose City of God specifies that magistrates, who lawfully sentence criminals to death, were not only the law's and state's instruments but God's as well. And, although he did not make a habit of explicitly transforming government magistrates into church ministers and God's executors, he sanctioned magistrates' use of the sword (exserere gladium) "to preserve public discipline." 38 Some collateral effects were equally, if not more, desirable. Blows deterred, but they also instructed and corrected offenders. 39 The latter two purposes could be termed therapeutic and, as often concealed "a lust to punish," which was related to the lust to dominate that afflicted all in power. The implication is that Augustine realized both the need to set limits to coercion as well as the need for therapy in this unruly, wicked world, conceding, as Charles Mathewes explains, that "no realistic political psychology can do without" the fear that the threat and the force of punitive measures prompted in would-be offenders. 40 The impression that Augustine was fully engaged in magistrates' efforts to control and punish crime and in religious initiatives to temper punitive measures to ensure select criminals' rehabilitation appears to reinforce contemporary historical theologians' and ethicists' efforts to claim him as a social reformer. He looks to them to have been comprehensively interested in personal and social reconstruction--and in penology's place in such challenges. Eric Gregory writes about Augustine's admirable, "civic liberalism." Claude Lepelley, acknowledging that Augustine would have preferred to preach away bad habits, features the prelate's anxious yet artful participation in discussions intended to establish tenants' rights without significantly eroding landlords' privileges. 41 Christoph Horn's Augustine is neither a political cynic nor a "holier-than-thou" (heilsegoistischen) escapist; to Horn, he was an activist struggling to cope with an ambiguous, if not impossible, task. Augustine, that is, believed that the world was as God wanted it--but also believed that prelates should labor to change it. Slavery, for example, was fallout from multiple wars of conquest but was God's punishment as well; donec transeat iniquitas, until social inequalities were obsolete, the iniquitous domination of one human over another would continue, yet Augustine was resolved to present bondage as a calamity and an injustice that licensed neither masters' nor slavers' inhumanity. 42 Given the uncertainty, one understands why there is not enough in his correspondence or sermons--and certainly not in his City of God--to establish his consistent stake in penology or in law enforcement. And his doubts about punitive policy seem to undermine attempts to represent him as an "accommodationist," to borrow a term from James Smith, who also questions the term's application; Smith suggests--correctly, I think--that Augustine was ever mindful of the "mutually exclusive teloi of practices" that gave civic virtues and faith's demands "their identityforming capacities." He knew he could not live by his ideals in the fourth and fifth centuries--as if the kingdom of God had come. He was not what Smith calls "antithetical," which is to say he was disinclined to condemn civic virtues. He lived strategically, acknowledging the divergence in the interests of the church and the government and allowing that the latter's imperfections were reflected in its punishments as well as in what was punished. 45 
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Philosopher Rae Langton uses the distinction between living strategically and living by one's ideals to illustrate the predicament faced by Kantians. They may strive toward the ideals associated with the categorical imperative against lying, say, yet, with predators at the door and prey to protect, they are loath to live by those ideals. Doing so, they would become instruments of evil. Langton makes no mention of Augustine, but her brief for living strategically in worryinfested waters (and for deception) applies to his consideration of punitive measures; Augustine, we might say, strategically participated in initiatives twenty-first-century readers would identify with social reconstruction, yet, as historian Miles Hollingsworth correctly infers, "advances that we associate with progress and development are resigned, by [Augustine] , to the realm of the conventional rather than [that of] the foundational." 46 To expect something more--to forge "essential continuities" and cobble together Donatists nor pagans had devised (or could devise) sufficient disciplinary measures to purge the sins that "never cease seeping into this world through our infirmities, as relentlessly as the waves 14 of the sea." The strategy was to keep the ship afloat--bonis operibus sentinate, to order all hands to pump out the bilges with their good works, but not to steer the ship of state, buffeted by rough seas to some secure harbor, well away from the waves of humanity's infirmities; no safe harbor in this wicked world existed. 49 Agreeing with two correspondents at the end of the fifth century's first decade, Augustine conceded that "pumping out the bilges"--living strategically--required close association with and not a militant distrust of--the world and the worldly who prescribe and enforce its punishments.
The faithful must work with and among magistrates, he advised, because "unless one conforms somewhat" (aliquantulum congruamus) and participates in activities from which the Christians would draw their neighbors away, they can do nothing to help them. For Augustine, however, Christians' conscience prohibited them from being drawn too close, from making prosperity or social progress their principal aims. 50 The church and the faith's sacred literature, especially the psalms, Augustine believed, summoned Christians from short-lived satisfactions, teaching them what they ought to desire. 51 The danger was that adversity, prosperity, and political responsibility weighed Christians down (praegravata). They forgot that life was perpetual perishing and feared the "perishing" that punishment prompted--confiscation of their properties, forfeiture of their freedom, and occasionally loss of their lives. 52 Augustine reminded them that "love casts out fear," specifically, the fear of government punishments. Good behavior that derived from fear was, he continued, far inferior to the good motivated by the faithful's love of righteousness. 53 Yet, as noted, Augustine considered fear and force useful. Prelates and ordinary people who were attracted to his "brand" of Christianity in Africa had to be protected from Donatists' alleged thuggish accomplices, the circumcellions. Pagan idolaters in Utica, Sufes, and Calama
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were known to have assaulted Christians of all stripes. In Sufes, dozens of Christians had been massacred in 399, after a statue of Hercules was defaced and toppled. 54 Bishops petitioned for and received rulings against the rioters, and Erika Hermanowicz has an intriguing take on their tactics. They asked the imperial government to proclaim severe penalties, she suggests, only to lobby local officials "to mute prescribed sentences." So Christianity simultaneously labored to deter violence and win a reputation for clemency. 55 Conjecture rather than evidence braces Hermanowicz's intriguing reading of the bishops'
intentions. Augustine's explanations are more straightforward and uncontroversial. They help us to place his thinking about punishment in context. The first reason he gave for distancing church practice from capital punishment was that the blood of those who caused Christians pain stained their casualties--particularly, the faith's martyrs'--memories. So Augustine coached magistrates to resist retaliation that "shamed" the victims for whom they were exacting vengeance. 56 His second reason was more pragmatic. Severely punishing the faith's persecutors would probably prompt reprisals, so few of the faithful would risk offering testimony, which could put them in danger. Ironically, therefore, when punitive measures were severe, persecutors were not deterred from committing atrocities, but emboldened, because victims were reluctant to report them. The victims of harassment and more sinister forms of hostility were in a difficult spot. They had been instructed by the apostle Paul to overcome evil with good (Romans 12:21); if their accounts of atrocities led to the deaths of perpetrators, they would be acting contrary to that counsel and at great risk. Yet their silence inadvertently increased the risk to all the faithful, Augustine added, for when persecutors learned their crimes would go unreported, they grew all the more violent.
Capital punishments, in other words, forced the faithful to choose to be killed by their enemies rather than to kill them through the courts. At this point, it may have occurred to Augustine that Christian bishops and government magistrates might collaborate to advance the purposes of each, to make more popular his once unpopular faith and to keep the peace, respectively. 59 But Augustine emphasized that he was profoundly disturbed by Nectarius's claim that civic piety and religious faith were distinct yet comparable and complementary "paths" to the same end. 60 Persons in public service might aim to reach the celestial city, Augustine conceded, yet they took the wrong road. He gauged that the very contention that secular service, necessary to sustain order with edicts and punishments, was somehow commensurate with "the obligations of love" incumbent on Christians leads misguided claimants deeper into exile. 61 As historian Ernst Dassmann noticed, early Christians turned their outcast status into a virtue; Augustine's insistence that the faithful were pilgrims on earth, exiled from their true home, is a superb example of that transformation. "Faithful exiles on pilgrimage in this world roam far from [the celestial city], the memory of which stirs sadness and sighing."
To be deeper into exile was to lose perspective, forget one's otherworldly status in this world, and become uncritical of it. Augustine warned against all this when he urged Christians, who were lumbered with secular responsibilities and, as magistrates, had to torture witnesses and accused, to do their duty while praying for deliverance from same. 62 Augustine, then, approved severity when it kept tensions from developing into religious conflicts. Unsurprisingly, he took special interest in deterring violence against Christians, so the obligations of love, for him, did not forbid corporal and capital punishment at every turn. When clemency, without risking the peace, plausibly served to repatriate them, or, as Michel Foucault wrote in his influential study of penology, "requalify them as citizens"--or, better still, to direct them into his faith, Augustine counseled mercy. 63 
